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INTRO

D U CTION

The Proper Goals of Antitrust:
When Public and Private Interests
Collide
Introductionby William T Gotf-yd
It is a pleasure to welcome you here today to
Chicago for the Hubert L. Will Conference. The
Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies is an institute with a focus on consumer interests. As
part of our mission, we are hosting this conference on policies relating to antitrust law and enforcement.
Antitrust is a prime topic in today's world.
When there is a change of political scene, a
change of political doctrine, or just change in the
economy, trade policy has to adjust and so too
does our antitrust policy. Inevitably, this stirs a
continuing debate about what the antitrust laws
are all about, where they came from and where
they are going.
In 1936, Mr. Justice Charles Evan Hughes remarked in an address to the American Law Institute that, "The history of scholarship is a record
of disagreements. When we deal with questions
relating to principles of law and its application,
we do not suddenly rise into the stratosphere of
icy certainty." The history of antitrust law is
marked by theory overtaking theory and philosophy under attack by competing philosophy.
There is hardly any other area of the law that so
regularly tests our national character as the regulation of fair trade.
The history of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
has seen many different attempts to expand and
1997

constrain the ability of the government, particularly the courts, to limit economic excess. This,
of course, is not very remarkable considering that
the field of economic and trade regulation is a
slightly more difficult subject to grasp in its application to the public good than preventing the
direct picking of your neighbor's pocket. As a
result, antitrust policy has a tendency, unfortunate at times, to reflect the dominant national
theme, be it expansionism, wartime pragmatism,
laissez-faire capitalism, or any of the other notions which may guide the public imagination.
Unfortunately, I think, you may or may not
agree, it also meant that good sense is sometimes
trampled in the search of politically attractive
theories. Thus, while it's true that history has
demonstrated some overactive regulation of
mergers and acquisitions, it is also true that some
very recent enforcement policies have been a
little Victorian and Social Darwinist in their approach. That is, let the stronger survive.
Recently in the Wall Street Journal, a commentator noted that he thought it was outrageous
that the Justice Department could be allowed to
levy huge fines against Archer Daniels Midland
for conduct that most people would consider blatant price fixing. He argued, in part, that the legal restraints against exchanges of pricing information were fanciful-I use his word: "fanciConference Presentation&113

ful." The commentator supported his position
by arguing that collusion is a good thing and there
are efficiencies that result from collusion. Well,
there's something to what he said. The lynch
mob is more efficient than the courthouse; and
in that regard, I suppose one could say that there
are efficiencies in collusion. Those sorts of efficiencies are not necessarily for the public good.
Judge Will, in whose name we are gathered
today, had occasion to remark at a high school
reunion in Milwaukee to a group of newspaper
representatives what he thought a decent democratic society is about. One of the things he said
was that a decent democratic society is one which
is open for new ideas. "Indeed," he said, "Ithink
the heart of a democracy is that new ideas shall
have a full opportunity to be expressed and explored, an opportunity for ideas to survive in the
marketplace, that they be presented, considered,
and determined on the basis of their merits after
full consideration." We are here, in part, to give
life to Judge Will's vision of a decent democratic
society, and it's a job I'm gladly going to hand
over to all of today's speakers starting with this
particular panel.
The panel has been asked to address the fundamental issue out of which all else, I think, falls,
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and that is, "what are the proper purposes of the
antitrust laws, and who are they meant to benefit?" Here this morning to take on the thorny
issue are three people of such prominence that,
other than by throwing this party, I would not be
up on this stage with them.
In speaking order, they are Mr. Ralph Nader,
the internationally recognized consumer advocate and father of the great nation of the consumer rights organizations in the United States;
Professor Richard Epstein, James Parker Hall
Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago; and Professor Eleanor
Fox; Walter Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation at the New York University School of Law.
We are all familiar with their respective backgrounds and accomplishments. Even their resumes make interesting reading. So, to make it
simple, let me just summarize: Mr. Nader has
said everything; Professor Epstein has taught
everything; Professor Fox has written everything, and that way we keep them all straight.
We are going to ask Mr. Nader to speak first,
Professor Epstein to speak second, and Professor Fox to speak third, give each of the speakers
time to respond to each other's position, and Mr.
Nader then will take questions from the floor.
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Presentation by Mr. Nader:
Any discussion of antitrust law and enforce- (EastmanKodak Co. v. Image TechnicalServices,
ment is necessarily a discussion about the distri- Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992)), which could be read
bution of political power in our country. The an- broadly, begins to raise different horizons. It does
titrust laws are the quintessential common law mean that, for all practical purposes, except for
of economic behavior in the marketplace. These collusive price fixing, one must be very optimislaws, the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and sub- tic to predict any change in corporate economic
sequent amendments, are very generally written behavior due to the antitrust laws as presently
and are susceptible to being overwhelmed by interpreted and enforced.
The dominance of the Chicago school, which
judge-made law.
In dealing with judge-made law, we have to now has some of its professors as federal judges
take into account the guidelines the antitrust di- and as associate justices of the Supreme Court,
vision of the Federal Trade Commission periodi- is itself a rather bizarre intellectual episode, and
cally issues, the political climate, and the nature part of it deals with the kind of research that is
of the judicial selection process itself. As a re- rewarded in terms of status, money, and promosult, it is not surprising we have had large fluc- tion. The research then is replayed through
tuations in the way the antitrust laws are inter- prominent business publications, like the Wall
preted in the last hundred years. The more re- Street Journal, Forbes, and Fortune, and meshes
cent cycle reflects the consolidation of power by very nicely with what modem day corporations
corporations and their political allies represented want the antitrust laws to mean and to not mean.
by the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administra- The sequence of this school of thought is a retions. This consolidation has resulted in a very ward system, a publicity system, and a connechomogenized judiciary whose members periodi- tion with corporate power and its ability to incally go to seminars sponsored by
Ralph PVader is an internationallyrecognized advocate
Chicago school of economics profesfor con sumer rights. He has started several groups insors and instructors.
cluding public interest research groups (PIRGS) which
These seminars have instructed aloperatein more than 20 states, the CenterforAuto Safety,
ready predisposed judges to a view
of antitrust that very much restricts Public Citizen, and the Coalitionfor Universities in the
Public)Interest.He has written several books in consumer
its initiation to purposes of efficiency
educati on including Unsafe at Any Speed which led to
or allocative efficiency and "conmanyfederalandstate laws establishing life-saving stansumer welfare," which are defined as
dardsf4r vehicle safety. Mr.Nader earnedhis LL.B. from
almost tautologically and empirically
starved. That does not mean that oc- Harva d University School of Law and his B.A. in Econnir.v from Princeton University.
casionally a case like Kodak
1997
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creasingly determine the nature of elections
through its financing of campaigns. Now this is
political reality, and anybody who thinks that a
discussion of these factors is not relevant to the
more arcane parsing of the antitrust laws and their
legislative history and their present interpretation and the nature of market power conduct and
share is living in a dream world.
The questions of antitrust are made more complex by technological change, globalization, the
ferocious expansion of intellectual property arrangements, and the expansion of joint ventures.
But almost every new development is given as a
reason for not applying the antitrust laws. Market share is no longer just domestic market share
and its microcosm; it is global market share and
potential entry by global competitors who are not
entering the market at the present time.
Intellectual property is now shaped (or misshaped) by the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), which places compulsory licensing laws of signatory countries at a grave disadvantage and the 20-year patent monopoly of the
U.S. at a great advantage in terms of that agreement. That is very critical in terms of the cost of
medicine and the price of seeds. And it was really quite interesting to see a million farmers
demonstrating in India two years ago against the
GAIT agreement because the agreement provided for intellectual property in [the form of]
seeds and the payment of royalties, something
the farmers found a bit uncongenial both to their
2000 years of knowledge about these seeds and
their custom of handing seeds from one farmer
to another without having to sign a royalty transfer agreement.
First, the antitrust division and the FTC, apart
from their will to enforce these laws, are grossly
understaffed, in numbers and in certain techni116 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

cal areas. The antitrust division has been trying
to get up to speed with the modem computer industry, and you can see they have still got a ways
to go here to catch up with what Microsoft and
others are doing. The laborious process of gathering data, pursuant to an enforcement process
or to issuing civil investigative demands in an
intelligent manner, is far beyond the capability
of these relatively modest legal and economic
staffs.
The antitrust division and the Federal Trade
Commission and its economists together are
smaller than the law firm of Jones, Day, not to
mention Skadden, Arps. Not enough is made of
that. Limited staff limits active initiation of cases.
Very often the Antitrust Division just waits for a
complaint to come in from a competitor and follows up on it. Well, that led to some nice pricefixing convictions and consent decrees in the
past, like the General Electric, Westinghouse, and
Allis-Chalmers one in 1960. That is not enough.
You have to have an initiatory and a research
capability. Take the example of the joint venture,
for instance. If twenty-five years ago someone
suggested that General Motors and Toyota would
engage in a joint production venture in California, it would have been a subject of mockery,
instead it was allowed in the 1980s.
Now take a look at that joint venture. Here are
the two largest auto companies in the world, presumably they are head-on competitors. Do you
think that our government has any idea of what
kind of exchange of information and what kind
of cueing and restraints are going on in that joint
venture? As far as I can determine, they are not
even monitoring it anymore. This has been part
of a massive expansion of the joint ventures between U.S., European, and Japanese auto companies, joint venturers, part owners, resulting in
Volume 9, number 2

all kinds of interlocking relationships.
I suppose it is not surprising that since that
process started, innovation in the auto companies has almost come to a halt, except for production and automated innovation, which has its
own motivation and imperative. But what was
once a challenge to the stagnant technology of
Detroit by the European and Japanese auto companies in the areas of safety, fuel efficiency, emission control, is gone. They now speak with one
voice. Of course, this only mimics an earlier
massive overlap between the oil companies and
their production, exploration, and refining joint
ventures. Now we have two or three oil companies saying they would like to combine your gas
stations and not a whimper from the public, or
the press, or the antitrust division yet on that.
Then we see the joint ventures, cross-licensing agreements and other aspects of the computer
industry. Does anybody really believe that those
are given fair scrutiny by any official agency?
They are coming out with such an enormous
speed and complexity that the staff of the antitrust division can hardly even shuffle the papers
much less examine or understand them.
The health mergers are another issue. Over two
years ago, the division issued health industry
merger guidelines that basically said, the way we
read them, if the merging partners declare efficiencies, we will accept it unless someone can
disprove it in the industry. Now, Columbia HCA
owns over 300 hospitals. And what is the definition of efficiency? Presumably efficiency is to
give consumers a competitive price, to give consumers the best price available in a workable
competitive market (quality aside).
It is hard really to even talk about consumer
choice here in a managed care oligopoly where
the president of one of these giant conglomer1997

ates boldly stated that he wanted to control the
markets in 14 cities in the United States, and,
again, nothing happened from Washington. We
all know what he meant because he spells out
what he meant in terms of the control of the market-massive market share domination up and
across. The definition of efficiency in the health
care area could be not market forces and market
power that restrict treatment, diagnosis, and rehabilitation.
It could not be market power that issues gag
orders to doctors which, in effect, limit consumer
choice by requiring doctors not to tell patients of
treatments that they could have but were not
within the protocol of the HMO to provide. The
same holds true for bonuses paid to doctors based
on withholding care from patients, including reducing their referrals to specialists. Whether there
have been under- or over-referrals to specialists,
to have basically an employment-determinative
bonus in terms of compliance based on withholding care is not just to compromise the efforts of
a supposedly independent profession, but also
to enforce it in one direction only by the profitmaximization model of the conglomerate.
In the telecommunications area we have, after many mergers and acquisitions, two cable
companies that possess 40 percent of the nation's
households-TCI and Time Warner-and following the Telecommunications Act, a massive
consolidation is underway. Disney buying ABC
has interesting preferential treatment potentials
that might worry some antitrust advocates. We
have Westinghouse buying CBS, so it stands on
a parity with General Electric, which long ago
bought RCA and NBC. We have Rupert
Murdock; Time Warner buying the Turner conglomerate. Now how is that to be judged by antitrust?
Conference Presentation* 117

In terms of their legislative history, the antitrust laws had the concentration of economic and,
therefore, political power very foremost in the
minds of the legislators. They did not give any
specific criteria of that, but if you read the debates, that was quite clearly a very primary concern. It was not just whether there be adequate
competition, strictly speaking, but whether this
country's going to be dominated by a few giant
trusts or a few giant corporations. They were also
concerned that competition be enforced by antitrust in order to head off the then growing socialist and communist movements on the European continent. They did look at antitrust as an
alternative to laissez-faire, but not as an alternative to regulation, which they saw as a collaborative way for government to improve the health,
safety, and economic performance of the marketplace. They were concerned about different
tactics that the companies had been using to force
out their competitors through predatory practices,
to buy them out in order to restrain or eliminate
competition, or to engage in collusive behavior.
'If you can't beat them, join them.'
What is interesting about the telecommunications issue is that the concept of efficiency, if
determined by the monetized mind, becomes a
self-satire. The industry claims that cable rates
have been going down with each succeeding
merger, but this is a rather difficult proposition
to demonstrate. The essence of evaluating the
telecommunications system is not only diversity,
but quality, and that may not lend itself to the
quantitative pseudomathematics of the Chicago
school. But quality and diversity are clearly factors that any common sense person would want
to ask in terms of evaluating how an industry is
behaving. Now we have further complications,
including the demonstration of the inefficiencies
118 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

of collusion and mergers by the companies themselves. What did 1IT do after it gobbled up 200
companies in the 60s and early 70s? They spent
the next 15 years divesting. The breakup of AT&T
by the antitrust division, which was opposed by
more than a few conservative economists-how
did that work out?
One might say that worked out pretty well in
terms of innovation and different applications for
consumer choice and consumer price efficiency.
I doubt whether AT&T would have broken itself
up voluntarily. Although having been given the
idea once, AT&T seems to be saying that is not a
bad idea. Let's shed Lucent and let's shed NCR,
which are examples of mergers that were disasters by all criteria.
Of course, there is the argument that the market eventually works. Yes, just like Keynes said,
"people will be dead in the long run." It took
three decades for "the market" to work for the
technical stagnation that was bred by the steel
oligopoly in our country, one of the most classic
cases of concentrated economic power leading
to huge layoffs, devastating communities, surrender of part of our market, like the auto company oligopoly surrendered to foreign companies, in terms of the dislocations that were involved.
We have to put a calendar on the consequences
here, and not simply say in the long run everything will work out. These self-propelled divestitures do give us some empirical insight as to
how antitrust enforcers should look at these mergers. The question is whether they should look at
the mergers and acquisitions and demand a level
of empirical evidence ex ante or whether they
should conditionally approve them. The latter
approach seems to be the policy of the FTC at
the present time with the pharmaceutical drug
Volume 9, number 2

management companies being bought up by the
pharmaceutical companies. The FTC has rendered conditional approval, but we all know in
reality they do not have the staff or the will power
to deal with these mergers.
Let's take another look five or ten years from
now. The FTC will not have the power or resources to prevent companies from reshuffling
their assets and corporate organizations. These
companies can make their acquisitions in such a
way that any distinct entity will disappear from
an objective reassessment by the Federal Trade
Commission.
The Defense Department also complicates
antitrust enforcement. National security is always
a consideration in whether mergers are to be approved or disapproved, and national security can
be a very qualitative variable. And it is interesting to note that national security is accepted by
the Chicago school as a criteria and that they will
concede the issue because of national security.
Now take the Martin-Lockheed merger. Here
were two competitors, two for the Pentagon business. They decided to merge. They went to the
Defense Department last year, and they cut a deal.
They said we think that we will be more efficient in handling Pentagon business as one company than two. Now the Defense Department did
not say," Is that because you have excess capacity? Is that because, as giant companies, you cannot retain the requisite specialists in order to make
competing bids? What is the purpose? Is it because you are too top-heavy managerially and
you want to prune away the lard?"
The Pentagon's position was that it is more
efficient to deal with one large company that has
the capabilities of both of the former two companies. For that, we are going to spend up to $1.5
billion of taxpayer money facilitating the merger,
1997

including about $30 million which is heading
toward executive bonuses for less than ten men
at the top of the merged companies.
Now where is the antitrust division? First, they
are always on the defensive when it comes to
national security arguments. The assertion of taxpayer efficiency is something that invites a redescription of the tooth fairy when it comes to
the defense industry, and the bonuses, of course,
had nothing to do with what actually facilitated
the merger. The Defense Department has always
been a thorn in the side of antitrust enforcement
agencies, but they have taken this now to new
lows in terms of reallocating taxpayer dollars to
facilitate a merger that presumably is made on
the basis of intra-corporate efficiency goals. They
think they are going to save so much money. Why
do they have to have a corporate welfare subsidy to top it off? There are not many antitrust
chiefs who can take on the Pentagon in a situation like that to begin with.
If you look at the staff allocation in the IBM
case in the antitrust division, you can see that
they can take on very, very few cases. The corporations and their corporate counsel know this,
and they know that there is a real staff allocation
problem in the division. They know that the division is going to jump up and down, maybe,
and put out a few probes, but to take it all the
way with credibility to a trial is just not going to
happen, quite apart from the way they read the
judiciary at the present time.
Now what kind of resurgence could antitrust
have and on what theories? One area would be
the antitrust aspects involved in raising someone else's costs. That is an approach that has
gotten some interest in the literature recently, and
the raising of someone's costs describes how rivals can be harmed even in the absence of tradi-
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tional price predation. For instance, in the Detroit Auto Dealer's case (In re DetroitAuto Dealers Assoc., v. Federal Trade Commission, 955
F.2d 457 (6th Cir., 1992); petitionfor rehearing
denied, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 11691 (May 22,
1992); cert. denied, 506 U.S. 973 (1992)), auto
dealers agreed to restrict their hours of operation. This raised the cost of third parties in related markets in an anti-competitive fashion. For
instance, it increased consumer search costs and
made consumers less likely to shop vigorously
for the best price, because they are at work. When
you limit the hours, you limit the discretionary
time of people to shop around.
The second approach is a wealth transfer as a
goal of antitrust. Historically, the antitrust laws
were supposed to serve certain social, political
and fairness objectives, but now that has been
replaced with this narrow definition of efficiency
as the original and only legitimate concern of
antitrust. The law's main thrust was to give consumers, not cartels or monopolies, the fruits of
competitive capitalism, and under a wealth transfer approach, you can see that, whether involving price discrimination cases, horizontal or vertical restraint cases, a different level of initiative
can be generated.
The third aspect of antitrust is the effect of
imperfect information. This issue seems to become more and more prominent with the increased complexity of the marketplace. Here is
where the EastmanKodak case, if read broadly,
might have interesting affects. The Kodak case
holds that anti-competitive concerns can arise
despite the absence of traditional market sharebased market power. The case holds that there
are now two ways to exploit consumers, one
through traditional market share-based market
power and the other through imperfect informa-
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tion that substitutes for traditional market share.
Imperfect information can make a market that
appears structurally competitive to behave anticompetitively. This is where we get into some
very interesting empirical studies of how consumers behave in the marketplace up against different market structures. In many instances, consumers were behaving not to maximize their own
utility, but in a very coerced or inefficient fashion because of the imperfect information that is
available to them. I think your Reporterhere at
the law school has a good deal of documentation
about what happens to consumers in an imperfectly-informed marketplace.
We need to give antitrust a fair shake in this
country with facilities to organize consumers so
to make it more easy for them to band together
with their full-time staff of experts so they can
begin generating some new realities in the marketplace. This would facilitate an improved situation in terms of straight-out bargaining, negotiating, as well as monitoring the enforcement or
lack of enforcement of consumer protection,
which includes the antitrust laws. Here in Illinois a prime example of this facility has been
operating with some success, and that is the Illinois Citizens Utility Board.
The theory behind these groups is that where
the companies have a legal monopoly or are guaranteed or subsidized, it is a proper function of
the regulatory agency to facilitate representation
by consumers in a coherent and independent
manner. This protection is already in place for
the companies, where the regulatory agencies
have permitted the transfer of costs such as attorneys fees, propaganda, and advertising, incurred by the electric, telephone, and gas companies, into the rate base. The effect of this is to
charge the consumers for the advocacy of their
Volume 9, number 2

own opponents or adversaries.
Just in terms of those kinds of reciprocities,
Illinois passed a law in the early 1980s requiring
an insert, at no expense to the utility company,
to be put periodically in the billing envelope of
electric, telephone, and gas companies. Then
along came the most bizarre Supreme Court decision this century for extending the concept of
"the person" to a corporation. In a 5-3 decision
with Rehnquist in vigorous dissent, Lewis
Powell, a former Utilities attorney, reversed the
California Supreme Court and ruled that this
regulation and all regulations like it were unconstitutional (PacificGas & Electricv. Public Utilities Commission of California,475 U.S. 1 (1986).
Powell ruled that the plaintiff electric company
had its right to remain silent violated and, therefore, its first amendment right violated by being
required to carry this insert at no expense to itself, no extra postage. The consumer group pays
for this charter under the Illinois law.
The people in Illinois passed another law requiring state government agencies to place an
insert like this in the motor vehicle registration
envelopes. The Illinois Citizens Utility Board
continues this project with 200,000 members to
develop a more informed and assertive consumer
constituency for matters relating to utility monopolies. Now this information aspect is not gen-
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erally included in discussions of antitrust. But
unless there is a different kind of infrastructure,
antitrust law will continue to bend under this
power that I have just described that goes all the
way through to the judiciary.
Just to reverse it a bit, what do you think the
state of the antitrust laws would be if there were
no professors writing the new learning, no corporate funded seminars for the judges, no corporate cash in campaigns, no right-wing politicians
being elected, no corporate power prevailing on
the Justice Department and the FTC? Where do
you think antitrust would be today? So they know
what an infrastructure is? They know what a
political context is to advance their interpretation of this extremely valuable common law of
antitrust.
It is time the consumer perspective realized
that as well. It's time the consumer advocates
begin developing their own infrastructure, their
own process to countervail the corruption of cash
in campaigns and other non-meritorious sequences. There needs to be a view of antitrust
that would be more faithful to the legislative history, writ large, and more wholesomely reflective of the connection between deconcentrated
corporate power and a functioning workable democracy. Thank you.
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Presentation by Professor Epstein:
The Narrow Province of the Antitrust Laws, Or, Doing a
Few Things Well
I would like to thank Mr. Nader for his kind passage. But, I am not here to denounce corpointroduction. I am the University of Chicago rep- rations either. The topic for consideration is neiresentative on this panel. So, by virtue of status ther the glorification nor the damnation of "coralone, I suppose I count as the right-wing voice porate America," standing alone, or in its relaon the proposed topics for discussion. And to tionship to ordinary individuals. Our real quessome at least, I might represent a strand retro- tion is what exactly are the strategies and techgrade thinking that is best banished from polite niques of corporate regulation that we should
discussion. But, I take a far more positive view adopt to advance some sensible measure of soof my affiliation and think that there are some cial welfare. This inquiry is not unidimensional,
messages that should be heard today even if they but should take into account the interests and the
have not been heard, or heeded, before. So on desires of consumers, individual workers, and
one point, at least, I actually disagree with Hubert even shareholders, all of whom have roles to play
Will. I think the essence of a democracy does in any long-term social investment.
not lie solely in the willingness to entertain new
ideas, although that is surely part of it. But some- Legislative buying and selling
times it is critical to reach back to some very old
It was very instructive that Mr. Nader began
ideas, which might with profit be reinvigorated
and reasserted in some modem academic set- the discussion with the connection between poting-not just as a talking point, but as a blue- litical power, which corporations can exert, and
its relevance to antitrust law. I think that this conprint for serious reform.
I give this brief introduction to make
RichandA. Epstein is the JamesParkerHallDistinguished
clear I want to respond more pointedly
Servic4 Professor of Law at the University of Chicago,
to some of Mr. Nader's observations,
so we can openly debate the place of where he has taught since 1972. He has written several
books znd numerous articleson a wide range of legal and
antitrust law in the context of larger
interdisciplinarysubjects. He has taughtcourses in reguissues of social and political organilated i?dustries,communications, contracts,criminallaw
zation. I do this not because I am a repand policy, real estate development, taxation, and torts.
resentative of corporate America. In
sorEpstein earnedhis LL.B.from Yale Law School
Profes,:
fact, much of what I believe would
cum la'ude, a B.A. (Juris.)from Oxford University with
make some titans of industry tremble
First C'lass Honors and a B.A. from Columbia College
in their boots, at least if they thought
that it had some reasonable chance of summa cum laude.
122 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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nection is a useful place to begin, but I put a very
different spin on the topic. There are two ways
to make a political deal: first, you have to have
somebody who is prepared to buy, for cash or
other considerations; and secondly, someone who
has something to sell.
The sellers in this context are the legislators.
The reason they have a great deal to sell is that
the structure of American Constitutionalism, particularly since 1937, has been read to say that
huge portions of the economic pie are always up
for sale depending upon who can get to Congress
first. This rise in political influence is a necessary consequence of a regime in which property
rights are weak and is subject to redefinition by
legislative whim at any and all times. A consequence of the 1937 revolution, shall we say, was
that a new depository of goodies can now be disposed of through re-legislation, not only once but
repeatedly. Once the legal rule protects individuals who are capable of selling, it is very easy to
find individuals who are willing to buy. It is commonplace in communications, banking, insurance, construction and countless other industries
large and small to witness all sorts of transactions in which fortunes can be made or lost by
receipt of a permit, a license, or a franchise.
This legislative buying and selling does not
take place only at the federal level with respect
to international trade and similar subjects; it also
takes place at the local level where, in fact, the
ability to obtain a zoning permit, variance, conditional use permit or something of this sort, can
literally change the value of a piece of land from
ten dollars to ten million dollars at the whim of a
single board or bureaucrat. My own view about
the subject, borne out by recent political revelations, is that when these economic rents loom so
large, and the property system remains so desta1997

bilized, the patterns of influence and abuse cannot be halted by altering campaign finance regulation or by trying to insulate political actors for
external influences. The stakes are too high. The
promise of gain too great. Water will seek its own
level.
Turning the guns inward
Now how do these insights apply to antitrust
law? During the consolidation of the New Deal
after 1940, it was common to hear the following
observation: in determining the appropriate form
of industrial policy in the United States, it is not
a question of whether we prefer competition or
cartels. It is rather all a matter for Congress to
decide in accordance with its vastly expanded
powers under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Therefore, what typically happens
is the antitrust laws represent only a very particularistic view that under certain circumstances,
at certain times, competition is the preferred
mode of industrial organization. I think the utter
inability to constitutionalize the protection for
competition as against some of its rivals has led
to many of the enormous abuses Mr. Nader described. If you want to talk about what is truly
wrong with America, you have to ask the question, "What about legislation that takes markets
that by all rights should be competitive, and turns
them into private business monopolies sanctified
by law, shielded from competition from abroad
so that they can continue to operate without interference for long periods of time?" The antidumping laws, for example, essentially operate
on a theory that low-priced competition from
abroad is a form of predation or unfair competition; and this is at a time when the entire theory
of predatory pricing is wholly, and rightly, dis-
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credited, under the antitrust laws.
Often the protection to domestic companies
takes a far more specific form. To give you but
one example of this, I was called a couple of years
ago by some desperate and forlorn lawyer who
represented those companies that wanted to import sugar at the world price into the United
States. He said every time they wanted to do so
they had to deal with quotas set up by the Department of Agriculture that were designed to
protect the production of domestic beet sugar.
Their cozy arrangement was that importation was
always restricted to the residual, or leftover, only
after domestic firms reached their protected production targets. Those residuals continued to
wither away in the face of expanded domestic
production above the world price. The justification for this grotesque scheme is that it has no
direct implications for the federal budget because
all the transfers were disguised and in-kind, and,
thus, shielded from the glare of unfavorable publicity that attaches to explicit cash subsidies of
domestic industries.
There is no conceivable way that a private
cartel of beet sugar producers could have produced this long-term result. It took the combined
exercise of power from the agriculture department, the state department, the commerce department and countless others to make sure that competition would never reach these shores. So I
think the first task of antitrust law is basically to
turn the guns around, not look at corporate
America, but blast away at the United States
government which supports a series of disgraceful and partisan practices that do violence to everything that the antitrust laws stand for.
Now with those moderate words, I suggest to
you, that an alteration in antitrust policy does not
start with the way in which private organizations
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try to put together their business arrangements.
Rather, it starts with the true colossus in this area,
the one legal monopolist who all too often confers its power upon individuals who have no business whatsoever in getting them. Now I would
like to think this was just an isolated area, but
we have a government which is much more adept
than that. We have an entire system of antidumping laws which never ask the question of whether
or not foreign importation works for the benefit
of American consumers. Rather, our energies are
designed to figure out why someone else is able
to sell for less than domestic firms and to eliminate those competitors which seem to have a fair
measure of success. We would do so much better if we ignored the question of why the prices
were low and simply purchased goods on favorable terms.
To see why, let us suppose that some foreign
government is silly enough to decide to subsidize the production of its goods for export. If
they are willing to share the subsidy with us, we
as a nation ought to say "thank you" and consume as much of the subsidized goods supplied
from abroad as makes sense at the price. Consequently, when we "bankrupt" them by virtue of
their own silliness, they will soon think twice
about subsidizing American consumers. Instead,
the antidumping laws invite major American law
firms and their corporate clients actively to support these dubious policies.
It is an area of law whose internal difficulties
I do not begin to understand. In a sense, I am
proud of my ignorance about the implementation of a scheme which should never be, even
though it enjoys the backing of powerful American corporations. Before we worry about antitrust enforcement against private monopolies, we
need a thorough renovation of our government
Volume 9, number 2

system to make sure that it does not become the
covert agent of monopoly power.

the Supreme Court has shown in the protection
of property rights in relation to trade issues. Thus,
it is commonplace for statutes to impose line-ofbusiness restrictions on firms so that, for exThe Supreme Court's lack of direction
ample, banks cannot sell stocks. Yet, the court
The next question is, "Should we expect any will not treat this deliberate interference with
leadership on these issues from the Supreme advantageous relationships as a taking (of the
Court?" I think the answer generally speaking is right of disposition inherent in most forms of
no. Let me just mention two reasons as to why property) for which no compensation is required.
the leadership on this issue will not come from Indeed, the thrust of Supreme Court jurispruthat quarter. The first point returns to the inner dence on property rights is to protect Mrs. Loretto
tension between the antitrust laws and state sov- (Lorettov. TeleprompterManhattan CATV, 458
ereignty which took place in the aftermath of the U.S. 419 (1982)), where the cable-company
legitimation of the New Deal in a case called wanted to install a small box on the roof of her
Parkerv. Brown (317 U.S. 341 (1943)). Essen- apartment house, but to remain utterly impassive
tially, the raisin growers in California managed in the face of restrictions that prevent new firms
to get the state legislature to prop up its cartel. from entering into competition with established
This was not a great inconvenience to California companies. I would dearly love to see the Suconsumers because over 90 percent of its raisins preme Court rethink its jurisprudence and to conwere sold out of state. What the Supreme Court clude that deference to a legislative intrigue on
held in effect is that if ordinary businesses just economic matters is not entitled to high levels of
want to organize a private cartel, which is likely constitutional deference.
to disintegrate over time given the multiplicity
of sellers, they will be hit with treble damages. Maximizing consumer welfare is not
If, however, these businesses can persuade Cali- preferred
fornia legislators to prop up the cartel so that
Now, the remaining question is what should
consumers in Massachusetts pay the price, this
the
antitrust laws do after they have completed
exercise by state sovereignty requires judicial
their first task, which is getting the government
genuflection that stays the enforcement of the
out of the business of propping up cartels. Here I
antitrust laws.
What happens is that this legal regime marks disagree somewhat with Mr. Nader and indeed
a complete inversion of the proper approach. somewhat with the stated premise of the ConState-sponsored cartels in the aftermath of the sumer Antitrust Institute at Loyola University.
New Deal legitimation are more permanent and Let me see if I can explain the source of my dismore dangerous than privately-operated ones, but agreement by trying to persuade you that the
they are given complete immunity from the an- narrow-minded, economistic approach, often astitrust act. This is not the way we want the sys- sociated with the University of Chicago, is intellectually rigorous, at least when pruned of the
tem to operate.
The second point relates to the utter weakness excesses of its most ardent devotees. This ap-
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proach turns out to have a surprising subtlety in
its application which leads to results that are neither counter-intuitive nor improbable.
The first question is what should the legal system try to maximize. Here, Mr. Nader and I are
certainly in agreement that you cannot have any
coherent policy that leaves some potential gain
untapped. You have to seek to maximize something, for otherwise you are willing to settle for
second-best. To the extent that the law looks to
get a little bit of everything, it opens up the system to so much slippage in the joints that the
upshot is the confused mush that passes for
American trade policy. It is just that tentative type
of thinking that leads to the excess of deference
in American constitutional and administrative
law. Deference allows the legislative operators
to take their slice of the action at the expense of
the public they are supposed to serve.
The willingness to stand firm behind a single
value has a strong therapeutic effect. It cuts out
the allusion that there are no right and wrong
answers in trade policy, or for that matter anywhere else, and forces everyone to think hard
about what should be done and why. It, therefore, becomes very critical to ask the question,
"What is it that antitrust law should try to maximize?" And the answer is not consumer welfare.
This would be a terrible mistake for antitrust law.
Consumer welfare as the ultimate standard is
selective and partisan. It means that you look
solely at the welfare of one segment of the population to the exclusion of all other segments of
the population. If you are quite literal in the application of the rule, it follows that if consumers
gain ten and employees lose a hundred and shareholders lose a thousand you have maximized
consumer welfare. It means you may seek a localized gain notwithstanding the enormous glo126 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

bal loss borne, of course, by other individuals.
Nor does this approach work to the advantage
of any group of people. In looking at some particular transaction, every person occupies one and
only one role. When we start to look at an
economy, however, the roles begin to flip over,
overlap and conjoin. I may well be a consumer
in one transaction, but, to the extent that I am an
employee with a pension fund, I am now a shareholder in the next. I do not think it particularly
wise for somebody to tell me that I will gain one
unit through a policy as a consumer if it means
that the value of my total portfolio will go down
five units. Indeed, if all consumers have pension
plans, then this global trade turns out to be a form
of mutual hari-kari. Therefore, we want to avoid
defining our universe so narrowly that certain
kinds of losses from antitrust or regulatory policy
can be ignored. Rather, we want to define the
legal universe so that all gains and losses to all
individuals in all roles over all periods of time
are taken into account, no matter how many times
this game is played. Now, this ambition is difficult to translate into comprehensive policy because the more constraints in the relevant system, the more difficult it is to understand how it
operates, or so it appears.
But in one sense this inquiry is a bit easier
that it sounds, at least if we put aside for the
moment some of the exotic complications about
human behavior, and ask how to design an antitrust policy that maximizes the sum of consumer
and producer surplus, where the "producer" under these circumstances turns out to be a whole
amalgam of individuals that includes shareholders-some of whom are poor, some of whom are
on pensions-as well as employees of firms
within the particular industry. We do not want to
take a state of mind such that every time a conVolume 9, number 2

sumer group loses an antitrust suit for any reason we have a political or intellectual crisis.
The second reason we have to be extremely
careful about a proposition of consumer welfare
is that it tempts us to engage in a certain degree
of demonology in evaluating business. For example, one of my favorite questions in contracts
class is to ask the students to outline a discussion of consumer fraud. It contains two topics.
The first topic deals with fraud by producers
against consumers; the second topic fraud by
consumers against producers. If you are actually
worrying about the relative magnitudes of these
two risks, my guess is that fraud by consumers
outstrips in importance fraud on consumers.
I recall a recent piece in the New York Times
that indicated that many retailers had to fundamentally re-examine their return policies for
goods sold to combat consumer practices that
were little better than shoplifting, which was also
a serious problem. Consumers would wear outfits for the season, wear them out or damage
them, and return the garments saying they
changed their mind on the wisdom of their purchase; or consumers would receive merchandise from one store and return it to from which
they had not purchased it, and simply claimed
they had lost the receipt. My attitude is when a
store starts getting tough on a return policy, it
benefits me as a consumer because it spares me
the burden of having to pay for such dubious
consequences.
In thinking about policies, we cannot therefore idealize any group of the population. We
have to remember the Adam Smith injunction
that producers who are left to their own devices
may conspire to fix prices, but qualify it by noting that consumers left alone in a changing room
may walk off with the goods. Once rid of any
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optimistic idealization, we can start to think more
soberly about antitrust law. To give a more concrete illustration of the way in which this particular process works, consider, for example, the
charge of a tie-in against the firm which insists
that in order to sell a certain piece of equipment
to a consumer, it is going to also require the consumer to purchase their installation services so
that goods and services are tied in the original
arrangement. One could easily think of all sorts
of theories about leverage and extension of market power from one area to another area to which
the traditional Chicago answer says that leverage is not needed to exploit monopolies. The
monopolist can just raise the price on the key
product and sell the remainder at the competitive level. This may not be the entire truth, but
certainly covers a large number of cases.
By the same token, there may be anti-fraud
reasons to use tie-in arrangements. Let a product
be installed by (A) after it is manufactured by
(B), and when something goes wrong with the
finished product, who decides the blame against
(A) or (B) when each points a finger at the other.
The tie-in device helps make sure that when one
firm is responsible for the whole process by testing the goods after installation. The issue is not
only important when both (A) and (B) are firms;
it also matters when (A) is the purchaser of the
good, for it will not do to allow (A) to recover
for defective merchandise if he (or his children)
are responsible for the product damage, only to
claim a defect in installation. The connection between consumer fraud and tie-in arrangements
suggests that tie-in policies need not retrograde
and need not be designed to hurt consumers. One
useful function they serve is to protect consumers who are well-behaved from having to pay
for the misconduct of their fellows.
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A more focused antitrust policy
From this particular case, it is instructive to
think about the general structure of the antitrust
laws. Here, as everywhere else, resources are limited. We have to organize this body of law so
every available dollar is spent upon those areas
where the antitrust payoff is going to be the largest. We should not spend large sums on exotic
issues of great interest to the lawyers who bring
them, but of little value to the society that underwrites them. Lawyers must not be as bad as doctors sometimes are. Lawyers should not spend
their money of the kinds of heroics that are analogous to end of life heroics, when it is better spent
on routine nutrition that increases the health of
the general population. Lawyers find easy cases
boring, but they are also indispensable for the
smooth operation of a social system in which
initiative better comes from other quarters.
The dissipation of energy is possible in antitrust. Mr. Nader referred to the spate of failed
conglomerate mergers, including the ITT deal.
When those transactions surfaced in the 1960s, I
remember my University of Southern California
Law Center Colleague, Michael Levine, telling
me that these acquisitions would not last because
they offered no synergy. Left alone conglomerate mergers will simply wither of their own accord, for the unification of three unrelated businesses leaves when all is said and done three
unrelated businesses. There was at that time a
kind of a corporate conceit, which I hope has
been lost today, which says good managers can
run anything without knowing much about the
business being managed. You just had to have
people skills, personnel skills, regulatory skills
and so forth. We have discovered, in the wave of
divestitures that have taken place afterwards, this
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maxim was a misplaced piece of optimism and
hubris. Most managers actually have to know
something about their core competencies in order to operate them. A business that has lost its
focus is like an academic who tries to master
everything instead of keeping focused on one or
two areas.
Since these types of mergers will wither of
their own accord, the antitrust lawyers should
ignore them and focus instead on those particular practices which are likely to persist because
they yield net benefits for the firms involved that
hurt the firms involved. Under those circumstances, some selection of targets is essential. The
antitrust law should go after horizontal price-fixing restraints that are devoid of any changes in
underlying corporate structure. Even horizontal
mergers are trickier than simple price-fixing arrangements because mergers do generate efficiencies. It is not just Chicago economists who
say that happens. If you put two oil companies
together, there may well be synergies in production if one has the technology for extraction and
the reserves on which that technology can be
turned loose. Mergers in industries that are unquestionably competitive, both before and after
the acquisition, can see the combined stock price
shoot up to take part in their synergies. I do not
see any of those gains coming out of a straight
cartel price-fixing arrangement, or (with a little
more caution) explicit territorial divisions. My
recommendation is that the antitrust division, for
the most part, try to concentrate its efforts with
respect to those areas in which it turns out diligent enforcement will yield the highest level of
social gain.
The question we then have to ask is whether
the antitrust law should be devoted exclusively
to maintaining perfect competition among au-
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tonomous firms over a wide range of products
and services. Unfortunately, that objective is not
always obtainable, so we have start thinking
about other forms of regulation as well. How well
does antitrust enforcement work in a world in
which there are extensive forms of direct regulation? This is, in fact, an exceedingly important
question. It was one of the critical questions with
respect to the enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Act and the period before World War I. It
is coming up currently in an extremely complicated fashion, with potential for missteps in dealing with the Telecommunications Act, to which
I will return to momentarily.
Generally speaking, firms can compete in two
ways. First, firms compete by going out in the
marketplace separately to purchase inputs, which
are then combined, repackaged, and resold. The
production function of one firm is independent
of the production function of any other. In these
settings rivals need not trade with each other.
Bloomingdales has no reason to buy goods from
Magnin's to reach its customers. We have a world
without networks and interconnections. But with
huge portions of the American infrastructure
some level of interconnection and cooperation
between competitors becomes essential.
It is of course possible to build two railroad
systems that run side-by-side, but, generally
speaking, the capital cost of parallel investment
is very high. What one wants is a series of standardized rails over which competitors can effectively ship their cargo from one line to another
line. The tracks are common and the cars are
separate. The question is, "How will that operate?"
Back in the early days of the antitrust enforcement, United States v. Terminal RailroadAssociation (224 U.S. 383 (1912)), laid down "the
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essential facilities doctrine" in order to respond
to this problem. St. Louis, being located on the
Mississippi River, lies at a junction of rail traffic
going east and west. It therefore was the natural
point to switch freight and passenger cars from
one railroad to another. Those switches could
not be accomplished sensibly unless all carriers
had access to the same terminals. The price of
exclusion for any given carrier was separation
from the rail network, and with it financial ruin.
Everybody instinctively understood, and Mr.
Nader knows, that when you are dealing with
bottleneck problems, you cannot simply use the
old model of autonomous firms and perfect competition.
In these settings the only sensible response is
to develop a set rules that requires all carriers to
be served at the common terminal, and to be
charged a reasonable price rather than one that
the traffic could bear, that is, a monopoly price.
The price may arguably be set by regulation, or
at least reviewed by regulation. The hope is that
sensible bargaining will take place in the shadow
of that constraint. But even my devotion to
laissez-faire capitalism is not enough to persuade
me (any more than it was able to persuade the
laissez-faire judges of the earlier era) that you
could do without some level of government regulation. Indeed the judges of the earlier time were
able to respond to this well-defined risk in a brisk
and responsible fashion because they were not
distracted by all the false visions about the reach
and the scope of the antitrust law.
One can go back to the 17th century and read
Sir Matthew Hale talking about the carriage of
goods by sea. He makes exactly the same point
about how the special rules that are used to regulate Crown monopolies. The monopolist must
take all comers at a reasonable price and could
Conference Presentation* 129

not charge what the market would otherwise bear.
That, in turn, was then incorporated into the English common law under the doctrine of "things
affected with the public interest" in a case called
Allnut v. Inglis (12 East 525, 104 Eng. Rep. 206
(1810)), which was decided by another very
learned judge, Lord Ellenborough, who knew that
some price regulation for monopolies was a necessary deviation from the usual rule that allowed
all sellers to charge whatever price they chose in
a market.
The phrase "affected with the public interest,"
which had its origins in English common law,
became transmuted into American constitutional
law inMunn v. Illinois(94 U.S. 113 (1876)). The
case involved price regulation in the grain elevator business and may well have been misguided on its facts, for it was not clear that the
regulated grain elevators held any kind of monopoly position. But the particular facts are not
the concern here. What is important is to recognize that the entire field of rate regulation
throughout the last part of the nineteenth century grew up in response to the difficulties of
dealing with the new monopolies that obtained
dominance in the railroad business and in such
fields as electricity and power and in telephone
and telegraph communications. In these last
cases, where the network elements are strong, as
they were with the railroads, it will not do to
break them up into autonomous competitive
firms.
Telecommunications and antitrust
When it comes to telecommunications, I cannot go through the long and sorry history of how
this industry has been regulated. [For one account
see MICHAEL K. KELLOGG, ET. AL., FEDERAL COM-
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MUNICATIONS LAW ch. 1 (1992).] Suffice it to say
that in the early days, AT&T did not get its position merely through accreditation. It did not get
its position solely by market superiority. It got
its position through a government deal when the
formulation of the Federal Radio Commission
agreed to divest itself of all of its radio stationsit was in the broadcast business at the time-in
exchange for a cradle-to-grave regulated monopoly with respect to telecommunications,
which was assiduously enforced by the FCC from
around 1930 until the 1960s, until it was undercut by the new entry of MCI and other specialized carriers. Matters came to a head first with
the breakup of the Bell System into seven Regional Bell Operating Companies, each with local monopolies, and a competitive long distance
market. (For the decree, see United States v.
American Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1982).)
There is no question today that removing the
legal monopoly status of the local exchange carriers introduces many new complexities. One
problem arises because the government had previously used the local monopoly rents as a source
of subsidy for residential phone users, especially
those with low incomes. Yet, I can see no reason
to subsidize rural or residential telephones generally, given the high costs for the limited benefits. Likewise, I see no reason to preserve restrictions on the lines of business that the deregulated firms can enter. Why should the phone companies not be allowed to enter, for example, into
the alarm business? (See Telecommunications
Act of 1996 § 275(a).) If you look at the Telecommunications Act of 1996, you see a Christmas tree for special interests in addition to some
fairly sensible structural reforms located at its
core. However, one of the reasons we continue
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to have monopoly prices is because we have universal service obligations. One of the great dangers under the 1996 Act is that those universal
service obligations might expand so that the competitive nature of the industry would be heavily
impeded by the taxes that it will take to fund it.
(Id.§ 254). I predict that AT&T and the regional
Bells may become friends again when the issue
becomes what is the size of the universal service
obligation under which they will labor.
Another point to consider is, "What do you
need government regulation for?" It is very clear
you need it to forge the interconnections on the
networks just the way you needed it in dealing
with railroad termination and transfer. If you look
at the statute, however, the FCC does not keep
its eye on the ball. They have two sets of provisions in there, one of which they need and one
of which they can get rid of. The first, and needed,
set of rules are those that require the sale of unbundled network elements in order to make sure
that the network forces will have duties to interconnect. (Id.§ 251(c)(3)). Those things seem to
be appropriate for either the FCC or for the state
commission enforcement. But when the statute
addresses the resale of vertical services, that is,
what bells and whistles you put on the system, it
crosses over into territory where there is no need
for regulation at all. (Id.§ 251 (c)(4)). Rather than
requiring resale of these elements at prices different from those of unbundled network elements, and so forth, they should have said anything that you could buy in a competitive market
you cannot claim as being directly from a local
exchange carrier.
Why do we want this distribution of rights and
duties? Because it turns out that allowing these
forced sales in a competitive market gives the
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buying company an enormous strategic advantage. If the prices set by the FCC are too low, the
buyers will gobble up the services; if those prices
are set too high, then prospective purchasers will
simply venture into the marketplace to acquire
them from some independent third-party provider. So the outsider can win but cannot lose.
By forcing transactions between individuals over
services that are not necessarily tied into the network, the law introduces a costly, mandated pricing system that can only do worse than the market.
On many points, therefore, the 1996 Telecommunications Act has the wrong system design
both on resale of retail services and on the creation of a universal service obligation. On this
point, it is best to remember that the function of
regulation, like the function of the antitrust laws
is to curb the uses of monopoly power. There are
very few things that an antitrust law can do well.
We should strive, therefore, not to fall prey to
the syndrome whereby we treat the antitrust law
as an all-purpose screwdriver that does a thousand tasks, none of them very well. Let us sharpen
the focus and limit the direction to the preservation of competition where competition is possible-that is, deal firmly at the very least with
horizontal price-fixing in competitive industries.
Where pure competition between autonomous
firms is not possible, we should require the minimum, but only the minimum, connections to keep
the network intact. Once these goals are accomplished, we can take comfort in the old Hippocratic maxim that says the primary goal of medicine, and the first principle about law, is "primum,
non nocere," or "first, do no harm." That should
be the prescription for the antitrust laws as well.
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Presentation by Professor Fox:
Antitrust and Values: Where Liberals and Libertarians
Meet
Steve Salop, who is a professor of economics as
well as an advisor to Professor Pitofsky, demonstrated how an efficiencies defense can work. He
began with the paradigm that competition law is
only about producing efficiencies and, therefore,
we should prohibit only that which is inefficient.
To understand what is inefficient, we must look
only at those transactions that are output limiting and raise prices. Starting with output limitation, then, as the one and only harm of antitrust,
Professor Salop showed how an efficiencies defense would work. He said that when a merger
Why do we have antitrust?
occurs, if the merger is anti-competitive, you
To begin, two weeks ago I attended an Ameri- must examine the extent of the inefficiency
can Bar Association Antitrust Section program caused by the merger, and then examine the effiin Washington, D.C. It was designed to reflect ciency gains.
What are the efficiency gains? One such gain
on the FTC hearings that Professor Pitofsky, now
be management cost savings. Another may
may
Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, organized to investigate the forces of
Eleanoi
world competition and what they
r Fox is the Walter DerenbergProfessorof Trade
Regula tion at New York University School of Law where
might imply about possible revisions
she tea -hesantitrust,EuropeanUnionLaw, international
in antitrust. Professor Pitofsky has
been concerned, among other things, and cornparativecompetition and tradepolicy, and torts.
about whether our merger law should
co-authorof case books on EuropeanCommunity
Shwi a
have an efficiencies defense and
titrust law, and the competition policy of the Cenlaw, an l EasternEuropeancountriesand has written nuwhether the lack of such a defense has
handicapped American firms in world merous articleson antitrust,economics and values, and
on trade and competition under the auspicesof the WTO.
competition.
The first two panels of the program Professor Fox earnedher LL.B. from New York University Scl tool of Law and herB.A. from Vassar College.
addressed competitiveness and efficiency. In the first panel, Professor

I am going to say a few words about the purposes of the U.S. antitrust laws; what they have
been, into what they have evolved. I am then
going to shift to Eastern Europe to speak about
what competition policy might do if we are starting from scratch in a new free enterprise
economy. Finally, I will say a word about whether
or not we should move to an international system and, if so, to what principles might we look
forward.
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be that by having three firms instead of four, redundancies have been eliminated and costs of
downsizing have been saved. As Professor Salop
spoke about what gains would be taken into account, he said the only question in antitrust today is whether the purpose of antitrust law is to
maximize consumer welfare or to maximize total welfare. Both involve looking at the efficiency
outcomes of particular transactions. Salop prefers consumer welfare.
Professor Epstein states that the only question
is whether, like Salop, one believes that antitrust
should be governed by consumer welfare or total welfare. One who has read The AntitrustParadox knows that Professor Bork, like Professor
Epstein, defines total welfare by looking at producer and consumer gains. What is left out? The
workers, of course, among others, are left out.
Is this truly what antitrust has come to? Must
we define what it is that we are going to maximize? Must we prevent only those transactions
that result in harm to either consumer welfare or
to consumer and producer surplus? Is summing
up the welfare outcomes of every single transaction equivalent to protecting the competition that
antitrust protects?
In the United States, consumer welfare is the
widely-accepted model or focus for antitrust today. The model prohibits relatively little. Proponents believe in letting firms, even big firms, do
what they choose unless this conduct is cartel
conduct or has this effect.
Antitrust scholars and historians know that this
is not how antitrust began. Competition as efficiency may be seen as the "flip side of the coin"
from the original design. Antitrust began as an
attempt to limit producers' power and to protect
entrepreneurs' freedom to compete. Much of our
case law is dynamic. If you read the cases one
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hundred years old or so, you will see that the
goals were to keep markets open, to keep them
free from being artificially clogged, and to disperse power as a check against governmental
power and, thus, to prevent totalitarianism in the
United States. When it comes to the choice between competition and efficiency, the Supreme
Court said, 'Congress has not given us the discretion to choose, and Congress chose competition.'
After all of these years of antitrust with the
freedom component, the autonomy component,
and the dispersion component, came great
changes. Global competition entered markets. In
the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a call
for cutting back the antitrust laws on the theory
that antitrust had lost its roots and was interfering with the competitiveness of business in the
economy. Our trade barriers were lowered, our
foreign competitors became much stronger, and
United States firms that once had power became
honed down by the foreign competition.
How did we get to the consumer welfare model
of today? In my view, by the roundabout theory
of antitrust freedom. Antitrust is about freedom
of enterprise. It is akin to free speech-the freedom of the speaker to speak and the freedom of
the listener to hear. It is about the freedom of the
producer-entrepreneur to compete on the merits
and the freedom of the customers to get what
they demand.
Freedom has been used in different ways
through the years. If you are a buff of Dr.Miles
and Oliver Wendell Holmes, you know that Justice Holmes thought that the antitrust laws ought
to uphold the freedom of firms, even large firms,
to compete without government interference.
However, if you happen to be more akin to the
spirit of Justices Black and Douglas, and more
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recently Justice Stevens, you may think of antitrust as freedom of entrepreneurs not to be fenced
out of markets on the merits; freedom of people
not to be exploited by those in power.
During the global competition revolution beginning in the late 1970s, there was a need to
modulate, to resolve the tension between these
two visions of freedom. There was a need to determine which freedom we wanted to preserve.
The view favoring nearly unbridled freedom of
even powerful firms overwhelmed the "free
trader" vision. Consumer welfare became a proxy
to limit government intervention in the marketplace.
The United States has done fairly well under
this new requirement. We have rationalized antitrust and thrown out the so-called baggage of
the 1960s. Our democracy, our markets, and our
free enterprise system are very strong. But at the
expense of the less well established business, the
"little guy."
Eastern Europe: Laboratory and lessons
In looking only at the United States, however,
one may forget the truly great freedom aspects
of antitrust. Therefore, let us look at Eastern
Europe. In 1989 and 1990 in Central and Eastern Europe, there was a spectacular democracy
revolution. This revolution brought a change
from communism to democracy, from command
and control, with inefficient monopolies growing top down, to free enterprise. As a part of this
change, the countries involved saw the wisdom
of free enterprise facilitated by antitrust.
In these countries before the velvet revolutions, people did not have economic rights to
choose what field they wanted to pursue. They
could be put in jail for profit-making. Suddenly,
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as a result of the revolution, these individuals
gained freedom of enterprise. Freedom of enterprise has become so important to these countries
that it is now recognized in their competition
laws. What do these countries need most from
their competition laws?
My answer is: the Central and Eastern European countries most need competition laws to
anchor their free enterprise. To do so, the laws
must prevent monopolistic firms from using strategies to block markets. Further, these laws must
be used to prevent cartels by prohibiting the firms
from collaborating, from acting like one large
firm, from going back to old habits. They need
to have a competition system that will be a strong
voice in the government so that enterprise can
be free and begin to make inroads without the
danger of being taken over and compromised by
the government.
That is what I believe the competition laws
should do. In reality, however, this is not the focus of the law. Many may remember when the
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, as well as the European Commission,
sent many individuals to help the new agencies
and to impart knowledge on a grass-roots basis.
Simultaneously, there was an ideological battle.
Many United States antitrust experts felt, after
working through antitrust for collectively a hundred years, that they had found the right way to
do things. They had discovered, they thought,
how wrong it was to include fairness as a value
in antitrust. They felt that fairness must be removed from antitrust to promote strong, hard
competition law. They tried to "sell" this point
of view to the Central and Eastern European
policy makers.
The European Union had an advantage from
the beginning. The countries involved wanted to
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join the EU. The EU's competition law concentrates on the abuse of dominance and the power
relationships between firms. It prohibits a great
deal more than the United States law does; it includes an element of fairness while keeping an
eye on the opportunities of small and middlesized businesses. It was clear from the start which
model the Central and Eastern European countries would choose.
In my view, even without the prospect of joining the EU, these countries would not choose
U.S. law. The Central and Eastern European
countries wanted a model of competition law
which provides fair rules of the marketplace.
They felt a need for competition laws to prevent
abuses by finms, to assure fairness in the marketplace, and to foster the growth of small and
middle size business. Price controls had just been
lifted, and large monopolies had the power to
overcharge and abuse.
The Central and Eastern European competition authorities might be best advised to concentrate their efforts with a view towards marketwide effects, eliminating roadblocks to entry on
the merits. They do look for such cases, but
mostly, they apply their law to protect smaller
market entities against what they regard as abuses
by dominant firms. A common abuse is imposition of a one-sided bargain. Dominance is found
at low levels; e.g., 30 percent of the market.
Somewhere between 40 and 70 percent of the
agencies' resources are devoted to cases of abuse
of dominance where a bargaining relationship is
unequal and the agency steps in to "level" the
advantage.
My problem is not that the countries wish to
rectify unfairness. My problem is that agency
focus on fairness takes resources away from the
cases that ought to matter the most, cases of real
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market impact.
I turn now to an issue outside of the traditional
field of antitrust, yet pertinent to Eastern Europe
and to the remarks of Professor Epstein. One of
the most important conditions for competition
and free enterprise in Eastern Europe is establishing rules of law capable of being understood,
and safeguarding both property and contract
rights.
This is a very difficult challenge, as the countries are beginning to understand. It is hard for
people to move to free enterprise and rule of law
from a system where property rights were nonexistent and profit-making was a crime. For contract and property rights to be protected, institutions must be established and due process guaranteed. Decision-making must be transparent and
accountable.
To the extent that free enterprise works, there
will be many decision-makers and a dispersion
of power. At some point, we may hope, the economic system will become so deeply rooted that
the political system will have a hard time backsliding into communism or command and control.
This is what is at stake currently in Eastern
Europe. Some of the countries are back-sliding
into new post-communist coalitions. With respect
to Poland itself, Anna Fornalczyk was the head
of the competition office for five years. She represented a very powerful voice for competition.
She sat at the table with the Council of Ministers
and tried, where she could, to limit government
regulation. Fornalczyk resigned after five years
when the post-communist peasant coalition came
into power. The new head of competition expanded the anti-monopoly office to include consumer protection. However, Poland does not have
a "Ralph Nader type" of consumer protection,
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and there is some question about the level of Bates challenged the rule that lawyers could not
advertise. If lawyers cannot advertise, the poor
enthsiasm of competition.
Eastern Europe provides a wonderful lesson and middle class people cannot get services they
because it brings us back to the roots of compe- need. When lawyers can advertise, prices will
tition law, and as well, it tempers our own vi- go down; a new and needy portion of the popusion. It tempers an imperialistic view of the con- lation will be served by the market. Therefore,
sumer welfare or total welfare model. It shows both liberals and libertarians want to remove rethe importance of focusing on market dynamics straints that block people from entering markets
and protecting opportunity for entry and growth, and from providing people with market inforrather than outcomes. It should humble U.S. au- mation.
In the year 2000, what will be the overlap in
thorities as they propose the one right answer
questions regarding trade and antitrust? In the
and model for competition law.
first decade, I believe that market access is going to be the area for overlap. Firms from one
Overlapping circles: Antitrust and civil
country should be free to sell on the merits into
rights,antitrustand trade
another country, the United States/Japan probI want to talk briefly about what I see as two lem sits in the background.
overlaps over time: antitrust and civil rights. EnAntitrust law and trade law are not identical,
vision them as two circles. There was a large but both promote the freedom to get into maroverlap of these two circles in the 1960s. The kets on the merits. Sometimes trade restraints are
idea was that the underdog should not be deprived anticompetitive, but not always. For example, if
of a fair chance on the merits, and the established you have a cartel of glass producers in Japan with
person should not get all the goodies based upon a boycott against U.S. glass, we know that this is
its status. Antitrust and civil rights admonished anticompetitive. Sometimes vertical exclusive
us to spread the net further. Let the underdog dealing is anticompetitive, but not always. Howcompete, creating and preserving economic op- ever, there is a large overlap between trade law's
portunities on the merits.
protection of market access through bans on govIn the 1970s and 1980s, antitrust law shrank ernment barriers and antitrust promotion of marfor two reasons. First, foreign competitiors were ket access through bans on anticompetitive regaining strength and U.S. firms had much less straints.
power. Second, the law itself was viewed as too
Now we return to Professor Epstein and this
expansive. There was a third interesting overlap discussion of Anti-Dumping, because in actualin the 1970s and 1980s, and that was what I call ity, the application of Anti-Dumping laws is a
the overlap of the liberals and libertarians. Both restraint of market access. It is a restraint of firms'
argued for a rule of law that would constrain selling into someone else's market on the mergovernment action. Cases I would cite include its. Even you believe that the Anti-Dumping laws
the Goldfarb (Goldfarbv. VirginiaState Bar,421 are handicapping the free enterprise system, you
U.S. 773 (1975)) case and the Bates case (Bates will learn that, regardless of your desire to change
v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977)). the law, such a change will be extremely diffi-
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cult to orchestrate, at home and in the world.
We need world conversation and bargaining in
order to get nations to ratchet down their AntiDumping laws or at least to make them more consumer-friendly.
Trade and competition laws interact with the
freedom to compete; the freedom of market access on the merits. I propose a principle to be
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adopted at the world level. There shall be no
unreasonable limitations of market access, public or private. Nations must undertake to implement the principle in a credible way, by whatever formulation they choose. This, then, is my
prediction for the zero zeros-market access in
the world is the frontier for antitrust.
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Rebuttal by Mr. Nader:
Thank you very much. A number of points,
responding mostly to Professor Epstein. In our
book Monopoly Makers, which came out about
23 years ago, we made the case that there are
very few government-sponsored or protected
cartels that are not almost entirely initiated by
corporations, in order to legitimize what would
be illegal or suspect under the antitrust laws. So
I am not inconsonant with Professor Epstein's
heavy focus on the government as the culprit.
But he did mention that the corporations were
involved-the truth is that they are completely involved. The corporate law firm of Covington and
Burling drafted the Civil Aeronautic Board's statute on behalf of the airline industry in the late
1930s in order to establish cartel pricing, an allocation scheme which lasted until the late 1970s.
In looking at the book we put together 23 years
ago, I noticed that there have been quite a few
eliminations of these cartels. The Interstate Commerce Commission is no more. Cartels got together in Washington hotel rooms to set the tariff pricing for trucking and railroad rates under
the imprimatur of the ICC. The airline cartel is
over with, and we have different problems now.
Surprisingly, we even have a tighter oligopoly.
The top seven airlines now control an even larger
share of the market. So the reassertion of oligopoly after a breakup of any cartel always has
to be a concern.
Some people think the telephone oligopoly is
now coming back together, not under the domination of AT&T, but certainly it is not as
deconcentrated as it was after the breakup. Tele138 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

communication rates were subject to monopoly
pricing cartel determinations, which are considerably weaker now and on the way out. The international cartels, like the commodity cartels,
are really resistant and have been operating for
years officially.
I do not think we can discuss the antitrust laws
without discussing the international criminal cartels and the massive expansion of criminal capitalization. In Eastern Europe, the former Soviet
Union, and Mainland China, these criminal cartels are not teaching our capitalists new lessons.
The problem is that they are not restricted by rules
of law, independent judiciaries, and exposure to
litigation by grieved parties. These cartels are
increasingly taking control of larger and larger
shares of world economic activity. Under a kind
of Gresham's law, bad or criminal business practices tend to drive out good business practices if
the former are not curbed by either countervailing
forces, such as trade unions, or by regulation and
criminal prosecution.
Secondly, Professor Epstein counseled us on
the Anti-Dumping laws, but that is a very easy
thing to hypothetically condemn. So as Milton
Friedman says, why turn down a bargain from
abroad? But the belief is that this Anti-Dumping will bankrupt the dumper eventually-thus,
just give them enough rope and their silliness
will hang them. The facility of cross-subsidization is pretty enduring as we have seen over the
years. It is not that easy simply to wait them out.
Dictatorships overseas keep production costs
artificially-depressed by encouraging or condonVolume 9, number 2

ing the smashing of any kind of worker rights or
worker organizations. They allow the huge expansion of child labor, which is indentured servitude at a few pennies a day under brutalized
working conditions. Seven and eight year olds
in India and Pakistan are producing medical devices, carpets, soccer balls, and other products.
These products are coming into this country. How
are we supposed to treat that?
Child labor is illegal in this country. The human fights issue in our country was given supremacy over the cost reduction issue decades
ago. How are we going to deal with that? Under
GATT, child labor is legal. In fact, when Senator
Tom Harkin proposed a law prohibiting the importation of products made from certified child
labor production facilities abroad, the Clinton
White House and U.S. Trade Representative
Mickey Kantor said, 'Forget it, Tom. Such a law
would be illegal under GATT. We will be taken
to Geneva before the closed tribunal and we will
lose, because under GATT you cannot restrict
imports based upon process standards, with one
exception, which is prisoner slave labor.' So it
is not that easy to make a blanket Friedman-type
assertion.
The next point I want to address is the product-fixing health and safety aspects of antitrust.
There is a great deal of talk about price in antitrust. There is also a great deal of talk about innovation, which may challenge and destabilize
price mechanisms. Back in the 1960s, I came
across evidence that the auto companies were
colluding to restrain the innovation, development, and marketing of smog control devices.
The California Air Resources Control Board began to wonder why no auto company would come
forth and say that their engineers had found a
way to reduce emissions. They all spoke with
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one voice, which presented the same stagnant
polluting technology.
During the Johnson Administration, I made a
presentation to the officials of the antitrust division proposing that they bring a case against the
automobile manufacturers on product-fixing
grounds, and they did, to my astonishment. The
case was settled by a consent decree, but the allocation was that the major U.S. auto producers
enter into an agreement requiring all members
to grant royalty-free patent licenses to each other
and to only take patent licenses from outsiders if
all members could obtain the same license under the same terms.
The effect of this agreement was to eliminate
rivalry and pollution abatement innovation. Since
no one manufacturer had to fear being left behind, the spur to innovate was blunted, and they
settled into inaction. This issue deals heavily with
respiratory diseases and other ailments coming
from higher or lower levels of air pollution, and
I think we ought to pay more attention to the anticompetitive practices, the tie-in arrangements,
the collusive practices, and the suppression of
innovation that damage health and safety rights
of human beings, the environment, and the biosphere.
You can imagine how producers of ozone-depleting chemicals can be destabilized by vigorous competition, whether stimulated by regulation or just by the competitive thrust of an innovation-oriented economy. It would be nice to see
more scholarship in the area of the health and
safety consequences of different types of antitrust or competition policies. By the way, in listening to Professor Epstein, I recall reading the
writings of George Stigler and Henry Simons and
even Hayeck. These authors were extremely articulate about how allowing concentrations of
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business power affect the deterioration of democratic rights and human liberties.
In addition, we have to ask how trade policy
is having anti-competitive effects and how trade
policies that prohibit subsidies are being widely
violated. One of the interesting aspects of GATT
is how many of its provisions are now just routinely violated because the major signatory nations want it both ways. Multinational companies want the benefits of GATT, which allows
them to escape the stronger health and safety
standards promoted by individual countries under a mandate called harmonization of standards.
The harmonization committees which arrive at
these standards are secret, and the standards cannot be challenged in our U.S. courts. On the other
hand, these companies also do not want the embarrassment of having their precious subsidies
challenged as a non-tariff trade barrier under
GATT.
These countries believe that other nations'
health and safety standards violate GATF-as they
interpret that agreement. The nations are trying
to circle one another to see how they can develop
maneuvers and bargaining chips in lieu of taking a formal case to the World Trade
Organization's tribunal. The WTO tribunal, by
the way, allows no citizens, no press, no public
transcript, and no independent appeal and has no
conflict of interest standards for its judges. And
if we lose in Geneva, as we already have to
Mexico (tuna-dolphin) and Venezuela (reformulated gasoline), we have to either repeal our regulation or pay perpetual trade fines to the winning
countries.
This is the problem of acceding to a model of
juridical resolution that would not be allowed in
this country: to have courts that keep the press
out and to deny outsiders a public transcript and
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an independent appeal.
The next point Professor Epstein made is that
consumers are also shareholders, and you cannot just focus on consumer welfare to the exclusion of all other segments of the population; he
made much of pension plans. This is the first of
two points he made, the other one being much
more serious-consumer defrauding of business.
This is a really astonishing statement. This is why
I plead to him and his colleagues that they do
bring some quantitative assessment to such Draconian judgments.
Before we really talk about the tens of millions of people who are shareholders, examine
the numbers. The bottom 80 percent of the income ladder in the United States, take all of them,
including their pension funds-they own 1.8 percent of the stocks in the United States, 1.8 percent. The top 5 percent own 77 percent. As far as
consumers defrauding and setting aside a kind
of self-help, they are regularly defrauded, in their
opinion, so they want to get their licks in too. I
once had a talk with the head of GEICO insurance company and he was telling me about how
consumers defraud their auto insurance policy,
and I said, "Well, do you know a lot of people,
when they have $200, $300, $400, or $500
claims, do not file with your company and other
companies because they think they are going to
be surcharged or they think their policy is going
to be canceled?" Does he have any data on that?
He said, "No, we do not collect data on this."
As for consumers abusing return policies hardly a big thing, very easily controlled by management, check out the price club for one of the
standards on how to control spoilage, as it is
called. Also though, some of these return policies are too liberal. They are just too open-ended.
They work for awhile then they get abused and
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then they tighten them up. No big deal. Who is
in charge here? It is not the consumer in charge.
The policy is set by the company.
Another point I want to make is that subsidies, both direct and indirect, are interfering with
market competition in the same way that government-sponsored cartels, which have been
eliminated or reduced, used to interfere. It is remarkable how rarely other companies challenge
this unfair competition proceeding from these
subsidies. It is almost as if they say, "Our competitors are getting theirs and we are going to
keep quiet because some day we want to get
ours." This is true for the forgiveness of utilities,
debt to Uncle Sam for billions of dollars work in
uranium enrichment services, inflated government contracts that are directed to companies that
they think are a little bit in trouble, such as
McDonnell-Douglas a few years ago by the Pentagon.
Another point regarding antitrust problems
that occurred to me, listening to Professor
Epstein, is that the damage that results while these
problems are being resolved. Yes, AT&T did shed
all of these companies, and it did wither of its
own accord, but a lot of people were hurt in the
meantime. A lot of communities lost their plants.
There is a lot of dislocation in the 30-year period after Harold Geneen's belief that if you are
a good manager you can manage anything no
matter what company or what industry. Now we
ought to keep in mind the in-the-meantime damage before the self-correcting mechanisms, which
do not always occur, turn the situation around.
As far as tie-in arrangements go, I think that
Professor Epstein's dismissal was too quick in
terms of dealing with secondary installment practices. I would just like you to read briefly why
the antitrust division was upset with Microsoft
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here before a very modest consent decree concluded. It did not seem to change the realities
that much. The complaint by the Antitrust Division alleges:
Microsoft gained a dominant position in the
market by marketing operating systems the
public clearly wanted, but as in Pilkington,
Microsoft then chose to employ various
unlawful practices, cement its dominance
for innovation and, in particular the
Microsoft complaint challenges a combination of provisions used by Microsoft in its
license agreements with PC manufacturers,
per processor royalties that tax competing
operating systems, licensing terms, huge
minimum commitments strictly enforced
that had the effect of locking competing
operating systems out of the market while
impeding competitors' access to the PC
manufacturing channel. See PPGIndustries
v. Pilkington,PLC, 825 F. Supp. 1465 (D.
Ariz. 1993); affd, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
14427 (9th Cir., June 10, 1994) (Ralph
Nader, quoting Department of Justice complaint; see generally, U.S. v. Microsoft
Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, (D.C. Cir., 1995);U.S.
v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, (D.D.
Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 1995
WL 505998, (D.D. Cir., Aug. 21, 1995);
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 1995 WL 121107,
(D.D. Cir., Mar. 14,1995).
The complaint further alleges that Microsoft
tried to get developers of application programs
to sign nondisclosure agreements that would have
had the affect of preventing them from writing
programs for those competing operating systems.
I know that was just an allegation, but many in
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the industry thought that just reflected market
practice.
Let me end on this note. I think it is very important to recognize that contracts of adhesion
have become a real menace to competitive practices. Recently, some American corporate attorneys advised the Bulgarian government to establish legislative standards that prohibit certain
provisions in contracts of adhesion, including
provisions like confession of judgment, in other
words, where their consumer confesses before
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anything ever happens. If we look at the latest
generation of contracts of adhesion, companies
like Columbia/HCA, Bank of America and others, banks are imposing unilateral compulsory
arbitration clauses. So you cannot go across the
street. When people lose their bargaining and
negotiating power, that means they lose the ability to generate selective choice and rejection in
the marketplace. That is another dimension that
maybe should get some attention. Thank you.
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Rebuttal by Professor Epstein:
I think that there is more agreement here than
meets the eye, both with Professor Fox and with
Mr. Nader. Let me explain. At the most abstract
level, the function of the antitrust laws is to maximize the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
That definition does not make the focal point of
concern rich shareholders, to the exclusion of
everyone else. The definition also includes employees and suppliers as well as consumers.
Yet by the same token, it hardly follows that
their interests can only be protected by allowing
them to intervene in any lawsuit which might
impinge on their economic well-being. To take
that course of action is to invite a form of administrative chaos, as so many items will be on
the table that full participation becomes an obstacle to the implementation of sound legal rules.
The public choice dimension should never be
forgotten, and the simplicity that I favor will in
many cases work well with the objectives that
Professor Fox set out in her talk. We want an
antitrust law that meets threats to competition,
and we want a general political system that is
hostile to the creation of subsidies that also distort compensation. In taking this position, I do
not regard myself as either pro- or anti-business.
Often times there will be business firms on both
side of the dispute, and our task is to figure out
which of the private claims is better aligned with
the social interests.
It is also clear that it is easier to attack monopoly than it is to attack subsidy. Within the
basic structures of modern federalism, it is difficult for states to impose barriers to entry from
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outsiders and difficult for them to use differential or discriminatory taxes to achieve that result. But it is all too easy for them to generate
internal subsidies that lure businesses into their
grasp. The competition to create subsidies for one
locale within a state imposes costs on citizens in
other locales, so much so that it very difficult to
track and correct the internal transfers that are
created by this form of interstate competition.
Professor Fox is correct when she says that some
simple broad rules are needed to contain that form
of discretion. But at some level, that requires a
revolution that goes far beyond the antitrust laws.
It is necessary to take a big bite out of the current system that permits states to collect taxes
and dispense favors, which they are clearly allowed to do under the current constitutional order. But never forget that limited governments
have fewer favors to dispense.
It is also important to recognize that free trade
and open borders make it more difficult to respond to certain problems (ifthey are problems).
To take one example, child labor laws are nonexistent or weakly enforced overseas. And we
are quite content to buy products from these
countries at prices cheaper than they can be produced domestically. There is much agitation to
shut down these dealings unless foreign countries comply with standards that are closer to our
own if not identical with them. An antitrust policy
cannot achieve that objective, assuming it is
worth achieving. And there is some question as
to whether it is worth achieving. While we may
do without the cheap goods from abroad, what
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happens to the individuals who are protected
by our conceptions of the child labor laws?
Some may continue to find work, albeit for diminished hours. But others will be cast onto
the street into begging or prostitution or worse.
So maybe we are right to bite our lips and to
wait until the general improvement in prosperity makes these practices unpalatable to families whose parents can now earn enough to support their children. The horror stories could
easily be more damaging than the ban on child
labor which could prevent any long-term increases in productivity.
Mr. Nader also talked about interim losses,
such as those that arose from the conglomerate
craze of the late 1960s. But that hardly assures
us of the wisdom of the antitrust laws. It could
well be that the tax structure induced mergers to
take advantage of loss-carryovers or some similar tax objective. It hardly follows in a world of
extensive regulation that the only firms that will
survive are those which can cut the mustard competitively. The rest of the regulatory structure
outside the antitrust laws must be fully analyzed
as well, industry by industry if necessary.
In the end, there is no shortcut to taking on
each piece of mischief in its own terms. If there
are some vices in given industries, then by all
means attack them head on. But do not pretend
that the antitrust laws can cure these problems
by indirection, no matter what the source of the
mischief. The objective of tax neutrality, for example, helps combat subsidies for given firms
or sectors and could lead to modifications of the
tax code in areas where the antitrust laws have
no reach or relevance at all. Pick the right arena
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in which to fight, and don't confuse a tax loophole with an antitrust violation, for if you do,
then the upshot will be more confusion that will
in time create more loopholes that contribute in
their own way to the maldistribution of wealth
to which Mr. Nader constantly refers.
The advice here is tread carefully, for often
the efforts to stop maldistribution of wealth are
hijacked into service of that very cause. It is hard
to combat maldistribution of wealth without conferring great powers on certain key political individuals.And that power can overtime be turned
against the very people it is intended to help.
Legislation is a mixed bag that includes, in its
output Anti-Dumping laws, sugar quotas and
sweetheart licenses for riverboat gambling.
Those outcomes often find protective cover in
reformers' efforts. So again, first do no harm
becomes the operative rule of the day.
To get the right culture, it is necessary to switch
the source of populist wrath from large corporations to large governments, which are capable of
funneling favors to large corporations through
the political process. The antitrust laws have
never stopped airline regulation or agricultural
price supports. We should not put our hopes that
the world will be transformed in the future. Competition works better with small government, and
that should be our objective-not an overgrown
antitrust law. "Covert tools are bad tools," Karl
Llewellyn said a long time ago. That is true today. Even those people who agree that Mr. Nader
has identified the ills ofAmerican society should
be deeply skeptical that he has found a broad
spectrum antibiotic for our social ills in the antitrust laws.

Volume 9, number 2

QUESTION & ANSWER

Mr. Gotfryd:
the audience?

Questions from blocked out of the market on the merits by artifi-

cial restraint. This is easily reversing the equation and saying that if there is a significant foreclosure by a firm with market power over somebody trying to get in, then that is illegal. You
could say that unless it is efficiency justified, that
kind of principle which we have in our law does
help the distribution in any law of economic opportunity and does not protect the inefficiencies
of small competitors. That is one of the areas
that I would concentrate on. Otherwise, I do not
think one should think of antitrust and redistribution.

Q: Professor Fox's comments about Eastern
Europe were quite interesting. They were even
more interesting if you compare them with what
is going on in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, where the Chicago school is as successful
there as it is in Eastern Europe and then try to
account for any kind of pattern. It is a complex
question, but I want to ask [the panel] to address
the point Professor Epstein closed on, that is,
what is and what should be the role of antitrust
law and policy concerning distribution of wealth
Professor Epstein: My view
in America?
about it is that you cannot do it. Most of the time
what happens when you introduce redistributive
Professor Fox: I think the dis- trade practices is that the wrong people control
tributive issue has been misstated with respect the ship. If you are going to adopt these objecto U.S. antitrust laws. I think that what antitrust tives at all, the best tool, and it is not a very good
does and can do relates to distribution of eco- tool, is a progressive tax. However, there are
nomic opportunities. Of course, it can do some- multiple difficulties with taxation. The chief one
thing relating to distribution of wealth when it is that people who do not have any income at all
takes money out of the pockets of the cartel and get no benefits from those who do unless you
puts money into the pockets of consumers. I do introduce some negative tax. I tend to think that
not think that if you ask the direct question 'what an effort to have cohesive solutions to this gencan and should antitrust do for distribution of erally tends to be too costly. My own attitude is
wealth,' you will get the right answer because that you are better off to give up trying before
antitrust is not the right tool to redistribute wealth. the entire enterprise misfires. I think the arguI think the distribution of economic opportunity ments about diminishing marginal utility of
is very important, and many countries have a law wealth offer a very accurate statement about why
which the United States does not seem to have redistribution is generally desirable. But by the
today which says that people should not be same token, the use of a coercive mechanism puts
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us on a collision course with the realities of public choice, that is, self-interest in politics, which
in turn limits the things objectively attainable
through government. The law must have a very
simple and clear objective, otherwise every program will in time be hijacked by the wrong guys.
first principle is still "primum, non
The
nocere""first
no harm." Follow it consisnocere- "first do o harts ollow insistently, and some good starts to emerge independent of government effort.

Mr. Nader:

First of all, the imposition
of costless health care due to lack of competitive
innovation for smog control devices is a function of the antitrust laws-

Professor Epstein:

No, it is

not.

Mr. Nader:

-to prevent product fixing, which imposes coerced costs on people, such
as health care costs or safety costs, like fatalities
in automobile crashes. This is not technologically
redistricting. The second area is overcharging,
the old traditional price fixing et cetera, where
you basically deplete the dollars that consumers
already have. And the third is - I do not know
if any of you believe that with the increased concern over distribution of wealth problems since
1970, the redistribution problem is worse. The
rich have gotten richer and the lower 80% of the
workers have lost ground. I agree with the conclusion; what concerns me is that since 1970, it
is not like there has been a progressive wave underway. Since 1970, progressive taxation on the
rich and corporate has declined and the problem
of maldistribution of wealth and income has increased.
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Professor Epstein: A couple
of comments regarding overcharging. We all
agree the cartels are not a problem. The problem
with pollution is not an antitrust problem. The
problem is having ill-defined property rights with
respect to externalities. What you need to imrsett
xenlte.Wa o edt m
pose is a pollution tax on automobiles, measured
by the harm caused, and all of these companies
would scramble for the best suitable technology.
t
Corporations were making two claims, not one.
They were saying "do not regulate the pollution"
and "do not require us to innovate." But if the
law gets the right control on externalities through
class actions, taxation, or direct regulation, then
everything on the antitrust side will flip itself
over. With respect to redistribution, let me just
give you one number, which is utterly stunning.
If you measure the relative income of a person
age thirty-five compared to one of age seventy
in the United States, basically, in 1970, the person age thirty-five had about 140 percent of the
income of a person aged 70. Since that time, the
ratio has shifted to 70 percent or so. The over
seventy-year-old set has seen growth in Medicare, in Social Security, and in the aggressive
(and unconstitutional!) application of the age discrimination in employment laws. We have witnessed the single largest program of wealth transfer that has taken place in the United States, and
it goes against personal income. You check out
pension-how much money do you need at age
sixty-five relative to age thirty-five? The answer
is sixty-five to seventy percent of the earlier income now that the house is paid for and the children are on their own. That was the ratio we had
twenty-five years ago. It is not the ratio we have
today. And so the reason I say that there is apreoccupation with redistribution is because this is
not redistribution based upon need. Too many
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modem calls for redistribution take from the
have-nots and gives to the haves. We often cloak
the transfers under the guise of "rights" as with
the age discrimination laws. But without even
knowing what we do, we have unleashed powerful interest groups into the fray. You might
guess that the American Association of Retired
Persons is not my favorite association. I am proud
not to be a member of the AARP. You are not a
member either, are you?

Mr. Nader:

What do you care?

Professor Epstein:

Itisavery

destructive social organization. What it does, in
effect, is transfer from the poor to the rich. That
is why I am opposed to it. I think being a member of an organization like that is an antisocial
activity.

Mr. Nader:

Look at distribution of
wealth in a different slice. You look at it horizontally: people versus people; look at it in vertical terms of the richest and the rest of America,
and see the concentration. Now, it is more unequal than in Western Europe when in the 1960s
we were far less disparate.

Professor Epstein:

I do not
think you could say that. It is discretion, which
has created massive political uncertainty over
private savings and which has had a large impact on private pension plans. The current system promises more to the current generation than
it can provide over a long period of time and,
thus, ushers in a Ponzi scheme that will crash in
the next generation. It does not take conserva-
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tives to stress this message. The same can be
heard from Martin Feldstein on Social Security
or from the Trustees in charge of administering
the Medicare plan, which is likely to experience
insolvency or severe distress within the next five
or so years. Yet when that distress comes, none
of its intended beneficiaries will be prepared to
meet the consequences. One has to look not only
at the gains from redistribution, but also at its
political risk. Yet no matter how these issues are
to be resolved, they are not antitrust issues. They
involve questions of system design and
overutilization which flow from the inferior incentives set up under government programs. We
would be far better off allowing markets to take
hold. The result would be for more managed care,
but in time its mistakes will be corrected. Gag
rules, for example, are not likely to survive even
in the absence of regulation. The voters of California and Oregon understood that it was not
possible to dismantle these systems because of
the occasional grievance. From the ex ante perspective, plan enrollees did better with the HMO
than with other, more expensive forms of health
care.

Mr. Nader:

Nobody is defending the
traditional fee-for-service. We are talking about
going to other extremes. The conglomerate managed care incentives are all going to the other
extremes, and the nurses were out-spent twenty
to one. They still got forty percent of the vote.
That is not bad for the first round in California.
The other thing is pollution tax. You see, you are
always shifting tools. I am just saying that when
it comes to any antitrust and product fixing due
to these kinds of corporate agreements that the
antitrust division has encountered, people have
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costs imposed upon them because they get sick
and they get hurt.

Professor Epstein:

I agree.

Mr. Nader:

It is not enough to say we
should do it by the tax mechanism. I am just saying it can be done by antitrust, and I am not impressed by where pollution taxes started in the
Ruhr Valley. It is very easy to develop
mismeasurements of those kinds of taxes, pollution taxes, et cetera.

Mr. Epstein:

You are wrong.
The antitrust law will not cure all our social ills.
It will not give us the right tax system. It will not
design the right rules to deal with pollution, such
as those which facilitate exchanges within a
bubble. My only lea on pollution is that once the
law designs a solid system of property rights, the
question of innovation will take care of itself. If
we know how to tax automobile emissions, we
can get the right level of turnover for older vehicles. Yet today, the U.S. government does not
put heavy license taxes on old automobiles. If
you look at sources of pollution, a huge percentage of its comes from the small fraction of cars
seven or eight years old or more. Change those
license fees, and pollution will be better contained. Yet, the major political parties have no
willingness to impose these charges because of
their fear of the cost on the poor. Whether that is
right or wrong, the antitrust laws will not address
that particular problem.

Mr. Nader:

By allowing a person to
get to work on the mass transit system, which is
not available, they will not have to have cars.
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Professor Epstein:

You can-

not have it both ways.

Mr. Nader:

You are trying to have it

both ways.

Professor Epstein:

I would

say you control the externalities.

Mr. Nader:

What are you going to do
when poor people cannot get to work?

Professor Epstein:

That de-

pends on whether some subsidies should be given
based on wealth, which could then be spent on
automobiles or on other forms of transportation.
But it is not possible to address the pollution issue unless the primary sources of pollution are
attacked. And on wealth redistribution, it would
help if the working poor did not have to pay as
much as they do for Medicare and Social Security for others who are better endowed than they
are.

Mr. Nader:

It is much easier to break
up a product fixing scheme than to make pollution tax on corporations work.

Professor Epstein:

You will

not get as much social gain from it.

Mr. Nader:

You are trying to use public policy in an area of tremendous
maldistribution of power, never mind wealth.
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Professor Epstein:

I am try-

ing to stop-

Mr. Nader:

The law cannot bend
power to its dictate if it is up against that kind of
maldistribution of power, including global corporations who have great maneuverability against
our domestic jurisdictions.

Mr. Gotfryd:

Well, maybe it is
time to move on to another question.A this point,
think
we Iare
covering
the same grundagain,
ground
re
tinkwe
oveingthesam
Although it is a very interesting part, it is for
another day. Do we have another question before we have to break for lunch?

in order to prevent the massive outages that
occurred recently in the western states, outages
that I have been told were attributable to interference from trees that some small operators
did not trim. Some form of supervision of system elements has to be imposed on every member of the grid, be it by government or private
parties.
The second question to do battle with is the
stranded cost question. Public utilities have invested enormous sums of money on the promise
that they collect certain rates so long as they met
certaininvestments
public service
obligations.
Now
these
have been
mandated,
theafter
law
whether
is
changes the legal regime. The question

or not they can recover the money because they
are open to competition and have to be paid for
their investments in some other way. There will
Q: I guess I would like to hear Professor be no easy way to solve this particular problem.
Epstein's view on what the proper role of gov- I think it is fair to say there is ample authority
ernment should be in utility deregulation.
going both ways. The truth about the matter is
that the best solution is for the government to
Professor Epstein: I can give buy back, as it were, the monopoly powers and
it. This is an area that I have worked extensively turn to competitive pricing, but you will never
on. Are you talking about telecommunication or get the political will to impose the taxes needed
y
the stranded cost debate with respect to electrical power?
eventually play out is the way it is playing out
now-that there will be a surcharge on some of
the services that go over the wheel which will
Electrical power.
then go to reimburse the companies for some, if
not all, of their stranded costs. Transitions always
Electrical create a terrible problem; as disasters go, this soProfessor Epstein: power
point lution is better than most, although it leaves a lot
power. The task from an economic powepoint
of play in the joints. I do not think we are headof view is to allow consumers at any point onon
the network to buy from producers anywhere on i downtany k in
ere arad
on
probmany
are
there
think
I
question-yet.
this
is
program
that
with
difficulty
The
network.
the
a very serious one which is not found, as best I lems, both technical and distributive, that have
can tell, in telecommunications. The physical to be faced. Legal transitions are always hard to
integrity of the entire system has to be assured deal with.You have previous mistakes that should

Q:
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be corrected and limited ways to work the correction. A somewhat pragmatic approach is required in light of the passions on all sides of the
issue. Theory may tell you the direction in which
the law should move, but that destination will be
reached only if certain unprincipled compromises
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are made. Notwithstanding my outspoken views
on questions of first principle, I tend to switch
gears and work more incrementally on transitional matters. So we can end on a note of moderation.
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